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INTRODUCTION
Prescription drug costs significantly burden many Americans.
A March 2018 poll by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that lowering
prescription drug prices topped Americans’ list of priorities for the fed-
eral government, ranking higher than comprehensive immigration reform
or ending the opioid epidemic.1 Spending on prescription drugs
accounted for approximately 10% of the national health expenditures in
2017.2 While the growth in prescription drug spending has leveled off in
recent years, spending on drugs shifted from traditional to specialty
drugs, which now account for almost half of all spending, but only about
2% of the prescriptions filled.3 With rapidly increasing drug prices and
insurance coverage that exposes patients to high out-of-pocket costs for
specialty drugs,4 the public has increasingly called for action by govern-
ment officials to address skyrocketing prices. In response to this outcry,
in March 2018, the Trump Administration issued a blueprint that directed
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to improve competition in the drug market
and reform the Medicare Part D program.5 While HHS announced pro-
posed rules in February 2019 eliminating the Anti-Kickback safe harbor
for drug rebates from manufacturers to pharmacy benefit managers serv-
ing Medicare and Medicaid programs, those proposed rules were with-
drawn in July 2019.6 In addition, Congressional members from both
political parties introduced bills to address rising drug costs, including
allowing Medicare to negotiate with drug manufacturers,7 importing
1 Ashley Kirzinger, Bryan Wu, Mollyann Brodie, Kaiser Family Found., Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll – March 2018: Views on Prescription Drug . Pricing and Medicare-for-all Proposals, (Mar.
23, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-march-2018-
prescription-drug-pricing-medicare-for-all-proposals/.
2 Anne B. Martin et al., National Health Care Spending In 2017: Growth Slows To Post–Great
Recession Rates; Share Of GDP Stabilizes, 38 HEALTH AFFAIRS 96, 100 (2019).
3 IQVIA, Medicine Use and Spending in the U.S. (April 19, 2018), https://www.iqvia.com/institute/
reports/medicine-use-and-spending-in-the-us-review-of-2017-outlook-to-2022 (last visited Feb
14, 2019).
4 Adam J. Fein, Employer Pharmacy Benefits in 2018: More Tiers, Greater Coinsurance, and Lots
of High-Deductible Plans, DRUG CHANNELS (2018), https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/11/
employer-pharmacy-benefits-in-2018-more.html (last visited Feb 14, 2019).
5 The White House, President Donald J. Trump's Blueprint To Lower Drug Prices, (May 11, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-blueprint-lower-drug-
prices/ (last visited Feb 14, 2019).
6 Fraud and Abuse; Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving Prescription
Pharmaceuticals and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection for Certain Point-of-Sale Reductions
in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit Manager Service Fees, 84
Fed. Reg. 2340 (February 6, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100).
7 Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2019, H.R. 275, 116th Cong. (2019).
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drugs from Canada,8 and rescinding any government-granted exclusivity
for “excessively priced” drugs.9 To date, however, many of these pro-
posals have not been implemented and only 39% of Americans say they
are confident that President Trump and his administration will be able to
deliver on the promise to lower drug costs.10
As a result, states are increasingly committed to exercising their
power to regulate the pharmaceutical market and reduce drug costs. Of
the states with active legislative sessions in 2018, only North Carolina
and Alabama did not consider legislation with the aim of reducing pre-
scription drug costs. Of the forty-four states that introduced bills,
thirty-two states passed legislation to address rising drug costs (see
Figure 1).
In this article, we analyze the variety of laws recently passed by
state legislatures to address rising prescription drug costs, as well as the
litigation challenges brought by pharmaceutical manufacturers to many of
these laws, and the ever-expanding legal thicket that states must traverse
to control drug prices. The extreme difficulty in passing meaningful
legislation and finding effective ways to control drug costs must not
become a reason for states to cede all regulation of the pharmaceutical
Figure 1. States Considering and Passing Legislation to Address Drug Prices in 2018.
8 Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act of 2019, H.R. 447, 116th Cong. (2019).
9 Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019).
10 Kirzinger et al., supra note 1, at 3.
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industry to the federal government. Instead, it must be a rallying cry for
states to try innovative new legislative and regulatory methods to control
drug prices and combat legal challenges by the pharmaceutical industry.
Defending these new laws will require significant resources, therefore
states must balance the effectiveness of a law at controlling drug costs
with the likelihood of prevailing in court. In that same vein, due to the
high likelihood that new drug price control policies will face significant
legal challenges and retaliation from the pharmaceutical industry, policy-
makers should ensure that they pass only the most effective policies to
avoid expending political and financial resources on policies that will do
little to improve drug costs. Furthermore, as prescription drugs account
for about 10% of the money spent on healthcare,11 states should consider
whether their efforts would be better spent on more general measures to
controlling costs for health expenditures (e.g. considering rate-setting for
all healthcare services rather than targeting only drugs).
In light of the challenges in passing effective legislation to control
drug costs, many states have designed new ways to control drug spending
using their role as a purchaser. Some of these programs have saved states
millions of dollars in prescription drug costs. While private insurers can-
not share in the financial savings from these public programs, they may
use them as models for their own cost-control programs. In this article,
we describe how states have used their state-employee benefits programs
alone or within larger cost-saving initiatives to control drug costs and dis-
cuss how they could be expanded to private insurers. Finally, we will
offer a series of recommendations to state policymakers regarding options
for controlling prescription drug prices.
LEGISLATION CONSIDERED BY STATES TO CONTROL
DRUG COSTS
Most states attempt to regulate pharmaceutical pricing through
legislation. In 2018, state legislatures considered 227 bills and passed
55 laws to reduce drug costs or improve competition in the pharmaceut-
ical market. These bills aimed to address pharmaceutical costs in eight
ways: 1) requiring biosimilar substitution; 2) eliminating gag-clauses
for pharmacists; 3) restricting when insurers and pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs) can change formularies or require step therapy; 4)
overseeing PBMs; 5) increasing transparency in drug pricing and its
impact on insurance premiums; 6) importing drugs from other countries;
7) prohibiting price gouging for drugs; and 8) regulating drug prices. In
11 Martin et al., supra note 2, at 100.
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the following section, we briefly describe each kind of legislation.12 We
then describe the legal challenges states face in passing these laws and
the potential for industry retaliation. Many of these laws effectively
address specific problems in the pharmaceutical market, but very few of
them will meaningfully decrease overall expenditures on prescription
drugs. Furthermore, the most effective laws for reducing drug costs are
those with the highest potential for significant legal challenges or
retaliation from industry (see Table 1). As a result, states may face a
choice between passing laws with little effect on overall drug costs or
assembling the resources needed to fight for more meaningful changes.
For the discussion in this section, we grouped recent state legislation
into three categories: laws designed to 1) target specific market imper-
fections, 2) promote competition and improve overall market function,
and 3) address prices directly.
1. Laws that Target Specific Market Imperfections
States passed three kinds of laws that are unlikely to face significant
legal challenges or industry retaliation. While they are important con-
sumer protection statutes, they only target specific inefficiencies in the
pharmaceutical market, and, therefore, are unlikely to significantly
decrease overall expenditures for drugs. As a result, the pharmaceutical
industry may have chosen to focus their legal challenges on other laws
that may have a larger financial impact.
a. Biosimilar Substitution Laws
In 2018, nine states strengthened their generic substitution laws by
including substitution requirements for interchangeable biosimilar
drugs.13 The provisions of these laws typically mirror state generic sub-
stitution laws, but generally permit or require pharmacists to substitute a
lower cost generic or interchangeable biosimilar for a brand name medi-
cation, unless the physician indicates otherwise. Currently, only four
states – Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama – remain without
any biologic substitution law. Existing laws regulating biosimilar
12 Also discussed in this volume by Trish Riley and Sarah Lanford, States on the Front Line:
Addressing America’s Drug Pricing Problem, 39 J. LEG. MED. __, ___ (2019).
13 The states are: Alaska, Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In contrast to small molecule drugs that are typically
synthesized in a reactor, a biologic drug is generally comprised of a large, complex molecule
(often a large protein or antibody) and is typically produced in a living system such as a
microorganism or other cell. A biosimilar is a biological product that has “no clinically
meaningful difference” from an existing FDA-approved biologic drug (the reference product).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. Biological Product
Definitions, https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Biological-Product-Definitions.pdf.
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substitution, however, require the FDA to certify that the biosimilar prod-
uct is “interchangeable” with the brand name biologic, something it has
not yet done. As a result, these laws have little immediate impact.
Nonetheless, in 2017 the FDA issued a draft guidance describing the data
and studies it requires to determine that a drug is interchangeable,14 so
the FDA biosimilar approval as “interchangeable” may occur in the rela-
tively near future. As a result, these laws may become an increasingly
important way for states to control drug costs with little risk of legal
challenge from the pharmaceutical industry.
b. Gag-clause prohibitions
In the past few years, many states have also passed legislation to
protect patients from paying more for prescriptions when using their
insurance than they would if they had no insurance. In their contracts
with pharmacies, PBMs and insurers often include provisions, com-
monly referred to as gag-clauses, that prevent pharmacists from inform-
ing customers when their insurance copay or cost-sharing exceeds the
price of the drug without insurance. In addition, when a patient pays
more in cost-sharing than the PBM or insurer pays to the pharmacy to
dispense the drug, many PBMs or insurers “clawback,” or keep, the dif-
ference. In the last two years, forty states considered and twenty-six
states enacted laws prohibiting gag-clauses for pharmacists, making it
the most popular pharmaceutical legislation topic of 2018.15 The grow-
ing consensus among state legislatures that pharmaceutical gag-clauses
should be banned led Congress to pass two laws: the Patient Right to
Know Drug Prices Act (S. 2554), which bans gag-clauses in employer-
sponsored and individual drug plans, and the Know the Lowest Price
Act (S. 2553), which bans them in Medicare Part D and Medicare
Advantage plans.
While the prohibition of gag-clauses and clawbacks in pharmacy
contracts represent a meaningful step toward protecting patients from
unreasonable out-of-pocket costs, they do not address the underlying
costs of the drugs. A study by researchers at the USC Schaeffer Center
for Health Policy and Economics found that in 2013, nearly a quarter
(23%) of prescriptions involved a patient copayment that exceeded the
reimbursement paid by the insurer by more than $2, and total
14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Considerations in
Demonstrating Interchangeability With a Reference Product Draft Guidance for Industry (Jan.
2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM537135.pdf.
15 AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, DE, FL, IN, KA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NH, SC, SD, UT, VT, VA, and
WV passed laws in 2018. CT, GA, ME, NC, and ND passed laws in 2017. Texas passed laws
with similar protections in 2012.
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overpayments exceeded $135 million.16 While $135 million is a substan-
tial amount of money, it represents less than 0.05% of drug expenditures
in 2013.17 As a result, these new state laws are unlikely to reduce overall
expenditures on drugs, but they show how a critical mass of state legisla-
tures can exert political pressure on Congress to pass legislation based on
state laws.
c. Formulary Regulations
The third type of consumer protection legislation governs insurers’
and PBMs’ use of formularies. In 2018, thirteen states considered and
three states passed legislation to protect their citizens by limiting how
PBMs and insurers change formularies or require step therapy.18 For
example, Minnesota required insurers to use “evidence-based and peer-
reviewed clinical practice guidelines when establishing a step therapy
protocol,” and to give enrollees and providers “access to a clear, readily
accessible, and convenient process to request a step therapy override.”19
While these laws provide better access to drugs for patients, these laws
may actually result in higher drug costs because they prevent PBMs and
insurers from requiring patients to use more cost-effective treatments.
Nonetheless, these consumer protection statutes allow patients to get an
expensive medication when their provider determines it is the best treat-
ment for their condition.
2. Laws Designed to Promote Competition and Improve
Market Function
In addition to consumer protection statutes, states passed other laws
that targeted prescription drug costs. Three of those kinds of laws – regu-
lating PBMs, demanding transparency in drug pricing, and reimporting
drugs – do not directly control prices paid for drugs. These laws, how-
ever, seek to improve the functioning of the pharmaceutical market by
increasing competition or by giving policymakers more information about
drug costs.
16 KAREN VAN NUYS, ET AL., OVERPAYING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE COPAY CLAWBACK PHENOMENON
(Mar. 2018), https://healthpolicy.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2018.03_Overpaying20for
20Prescription20Drugs_White20Paper_v.1-2.pdf.
17 Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending In 2013: Growth Slows, Remains In Step With
The Overall Economy, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 150, 152 (2015) (showing prescription drug spending
was $271.1 billion in 2013).
18 When using step therapy, an insurer may require a patient to try a less expensive alternative
before "stepping up” to cover a more expensive medication.
19 H.F. 3196, 90th Leg., 162d Sess. (Minn. 2018).
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a. Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers
One of the more popular types of legislation of 2018 was the regu-
lation of PBMs; that year, 32 states considered, and 15 states passed bills
requiring PBMs to be licensed in the state or disclose additional informa-
tion about drug prices. PBMs administer prescription drug benefits for
plan sponsors (e.g. self-insured employers, insurance companies,
Medicare Part D beneficiaries) by creating drug formularies and negotiat-
ing reimbursement rates with drug manufacturers and pharmacies. States
have begun to regulate PBM practices because PBM prescription reim-
bursement can lead to misaligned financial incentives between the PBM
and the patient or plan sponsor (i.e. payment practices that encourage
drugs with high list prices and commensurately high rebates).
Furthermore, many of these reimbursement payments are shrouded in
secrecy from the insurers, employers, and patients who pay for the drugs.
At least 48 states have laws regulating PBMs, including 29 states that
require PBMs to be licensed to operate in the state.20 Other states require
PBMs to publish lists of the maximum allowable costs (MAC), which
are used to negotiate rates with pharmacies, and to follow certain proce-
dures when auditing pharmacies.21 To date, California’s AB-315 is one
of the most comprehensive laws regulating PBMs. Passed in 2018, the
law requires PBMs to register with the state’s Department of Managed
Health Care (DMHC) and disclose aggregate rebates to purchasers.
Laws to regulate and license PBMs may give states additional over-
sight of PBMs, but legislators must carefully craft those laws to avoid
preemption by federal laws. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)22 has been the most problematic federal law for
states to navigate when trying to regulate PBMs. Congress passed ERISA
to provide uniform, federal standards for pensions and employee benefit
plans, including health plans. Section 514 of ERISA expressly preempts
state laws that “relate to any employee benefit plan.”23 Recognizing that
the exact scope of ERISA preemption as written in the statute is broad
and imprecise, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test to determine
if a state law is preempted. Specifically, the Court held a state law
20 The seventeen states with PBM license requirements prior to 2018 are Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Florida, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and West
Virginia passed new laws in 2018 requiring PBMs to be licensed. Utah passed a law in 2019.
21 JANET KAMINSKI LEDUC, CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, STATE
LAWS CONCERNING PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS 6 (Mar. 1, 2018), available as report 2018-R-
0083 at https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0083.pdf).
22 29U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
23 ERISA § 514(a) (2012); 29U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
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“relates to” an ERISA plan if it has “[1] a connection with or [2] a refer-
ence to such a plan.”24 A state law makes an “impermissible connection”
with ERISA plans when it “governs a central matter of plan adminis-
tration” or “interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.”25 A
state law also makes “an impermissible ‘reference to’ ERISA plans where
it ‘acts immediately and exclusively on ERISA plans … or where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.’”26 The
judicial interpretation of these standards has, unfortunately, varied signifi-
cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, significantly muddying the waters
for state legislators and industry stakeholders.
In addition, Congress exempted state insurance regulations, includ-
ing health insurance regulations, from ERISA preemption, but it did not
deem self-insured employer benefits to constitute insurance. As a result,
states cannot regulate self-insured employer health benefit plans, which
provide coverage for approximately 60% of Americans with employer-
sponsored insurance plans.27 Congress passed ERISA to promote inter-
state commerce and to protect large employers from having to comply
with a patchwork of state regulations, but the Supreme Court broadened
the preemptive reach of ERISA in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.28 The Supreme Court held ERISA preempted a Vermont statute
that required all insurers, including self-insured employers, to report
their health care claims data, because such reporting had an
“impermissible connection with ERISA plans” because it interfered
with the uniformity of plan administration.29 As a result, states have
been forced to exempt self-funded employer-based plans and the PBMs
that serve them from adhering to state reporting requirements, thereby
crippling accurate and comprehensive transparency efforts at the
state level.
Consequently, despite state attempts to avoid ERISA preemption,
the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), the trade
organization representing PBMs, routinely challenges state laws that
24 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519U.S. 316, 324
(1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514U.S.
645, 656 (1995); Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 140
(1st Cir. 2000).
25 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Gerhart 852 F.3d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gobeille v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S.Ct. 936, 943 (2016)).
26 Gerhart, 852 F.3d at 728.
27 Erin Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s impediment to state health reform, 378
N ENGL J MED. 5, 6 (2018); HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HEALTH RESEARCH AND
EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY (September 29, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2017-section-10-plan-funding/.
28 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S.Ct. 936, 943 (2016).
29 Id.
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require disclosures from PBMs. In Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v.
Gerhart,30 the PCMA successfully brought an ERISA preemption claim
against an Iowa law31 requiring PBMs to disclose pricing methodology
to the state insurance commissioner and their in-network pharmacies.
State legislators specifically excluded PBMs serving any “self-funded
health coverage plan that is exempt from state regulation pursuant to the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)”
from the law. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that this exemption
made an “impermissible reference to ERISA” and preempted the entire
law.32 In June 2018, the same court also found that ERISA and Medicare
Part D statutes preempted Arkansas’s Act 900, which regulates how
PBMs set reimbursement rates for pharmacies filling generic drug pre-
scriptions and requires that PBMs pay all pharmacies the same reim-
bursement rates as affiliated pharmacies.33 The 8th Circuit found that the
Arkansas law both “relates to and has a connection with employee bene-
fit plans.”34 The U.S. District Court for the district of North Dakota,
however, deviated from the 8th Circuit’s35 reasoning when it upheld two
North Dakota laws containing multiple provisions that place restrictions
on PBMs.36 In a more nuanced and probing opinion, that court found
that neither law “govern[ed] a matter central to ERISA plan adminis-
tration” and the effect on health plans was “too tenuous to constitute
interference with nationally uniform plan administration.”37 These seem-
ingly conflicting court decisions leave states in a quagmire with few clear
boundaries on ERISA’s ever-growing preemptive reach. Until the
Supreme Court gives states guidance about the limits of what constitutes
an improper reference or connection to an ERISA plan, any state seeking
to regulate PBMs will likely face legal challenges with uncertain out-
comes.38 The complexity and opacity of ERISA preemption mean that
states will need help from the federal government to enact meaningful
regulation of PBMs.
Furthermore, recent consolidation in the PBM market further
increases the importance of transparency and oversight. Three PBMs
(CVS Caremark, OptumRx, and Express Scripts) control approximately
30 Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722.
31 IOWA CODE § 510B.8 (2019).
32 Gerhart, 852 F.3d at 727-732.
33 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rutledge, 891 F.3d 1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 2018).
34 Id. at 1112.
35 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tufte, 326 F. Supp. 3d 873, 884 (D.N.D. 2018).
36 S.B. 2258, 2017 Leg., 65th Sess. (N.D. 2017); S.B. 2301, 2017 Leg., 65th Sess. (N.D. 2017)
(enacted as N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-16.1).
37 Tufte, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 887.
38 As of this writing, the Supreme Court is considering a petition for a writ of certiorari from the
state of Arkansas to hear an appeal in Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rutledge (18-540).
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75% of the PBM market,39 and all three of them are or will likely
become vertically integrated with an insurer, essentially eliminating
standalone PBMs.40 Both the vertical and horizontal consolidation leaves
many experts and lawmakers questioning whether the remaining PBMs
have the necessary incentive to negotiate strongly for their beneficiaries
and pass those savings on to plan sponsors. Moreover, vertical integration
between insurers and PBMs obfuscates negotiated payments for prescrip-
tions drugs, leaving payers, lawmakers, and researchers with little data to
determine whether PBMs save payers money. As a result, laws to ensure
that PBMs act in the interest of their beneficiaries remain critical, but
ERISA hinders the ability of states to demand transparency from PBMs.
b. Pricing Transparency/Reports on Drug Prices
In addition to demanding transparency regarding PBM rebates and
practices, some state legislatures sought to increase the transparency of
drug prices overall and how those prices affect insurance premiums.
These laws give policymakers data to understand how prescription drugs
affect insurance premiums in their state. In addition, they shine a light
on supra-competitive drug pricing practices, potentially shaming manu-
facturers into lowering them. In 2017, two states – California and
Nevada – passed pricing transparency laws to increase transparency in
drug prices. Following on that momentum, in 2018, twenty-four states
considered and six states passed legislation to improve drug price
transparency.41
These laws do not directly control drug costs; nevertheless, the
information gathered by state agencies can guide future legislative or
regulatory actions. In California, for example, the Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development’s Prescription Drug Cost Transparency
Report found that specialty drugs accounted for over half of the money
insurers spent on prescription drugs, even though specialty drugs only
39 Adam J. Fein, Cigna-Express Scripts: Vertical Integration and PBMs' Medical-Pharmacy Future
(rerun), DRUG CHANNELS (2018), https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/05/cigna-express-scripts-
vertical.html (last visited Feb 15, 2019).
40 CVS Caremark is a PBM/Pharmacy group and will soon merge with the insurer Aetna (see Al-
Muslim, Aisha, CVS Lays Out Vision for Future as Aetna Merger Looms., THE WALL STREET J,
Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cvs-reports-higher-revenue-profit-1541507882.).
ExpressScripts and the insurer Cigna have approval from the Justice Department to merge (see
Abelson, Reed, Merger of Cigna and Express Scripts Gets Approval From Justice Dep’t., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/health/cigna-express-scripts-merger.
html, and Federal Trade Commission, 20180982: Express Scripts Holding Company; Cigna
Corporation. Premerger Notification Granted (September 17, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-termination-notices/20180982. OptumRx is
already owned by the insurer UnitedHealth Group.
41 CT, LA, ME, NH, OR, VT passed laws; CO, HI, IN, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, NE, NH, NJ, NY,
PA, RI, SC, TN, WA, and WI also considered bills.
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accounted for only 1.6 percent of all prescriptions.42 Similarly, in
Nevada, the state determined that “five manufacturers account for 59%
of [the essential diabetes drugs] …with a significant price increase… in
the last one or two-year periods”.43 These reports derived from price
transparency initiatives suggest that interventions targeted at controlling
the costs of individual specialty drugs could reduce drug expenditures.
Transparency laws alone, however, are unlikely to significantly affect
drug prices, especially if manufacturers do not respond to public reports
of price increases. These laws have the greatest value when synergistic-
ally integrated into statewide policymaking to identify specific market
inefficiencies and the most effective interventions. For example, a state
considering rate review legislation could use information gleaned from
reports mandated through transparency laws to know where to target their
interventions.
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry vigorously challenged
both of the 2017 state drug price transparency laws, claiming federal pre-
emption by the dormant commerce clause and trade secret laws. The
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce,
and the dormant commerce clause (DCC) is a long-standing judicial
interpretation that prohibits states from passing laws that discriminate
against out of state competitors or unduly burden interstate commerce.
According to the balancing test established by the Supreme Court in Pike
v. Bruce Church Inc., a law that “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest… will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits [provided by the law].”44 States seeking disclo-
sures of public pharmaceutical pricing information, like the wholesale
acquisition cost (WAC), a federally defined list price,45 have a strong
claim in favor of a legitimate public interest in obtaining the information.
Nonetheless, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) alleges that the dormant commerce clause preempts
California’s SB-17 because, under the law, a manufacturer cannot
increase the WAC of a drug without waiting 60 days or facing financial
42 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COST TRANSPARENCY
REPORT (SB 17) MEASUREMENT YEAR 2017 (January 2019), https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/Portals/0/
Docs/DO/sb17.pdf.
43 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ANALYSIS OF ESSENTIAL DIABETES DRUGS
THAT HAD A PRICE INCREASE (Sept. 30, 2018), http://dhhs.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhhsnvgov/content/
HCPWD/Analysis%20of%20Essential%20Diabetes%20Drugs%20that%20had%20a%20Price%
20Increase_09.30.2018.pdf
44 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970).
45 42U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) (2011).
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penalties assessed by the state of California.46 Since many wholesalers
and pharmacies base their contracts on the WAC price, PhRMA asserts
that California’s law becomes a nationwide ban on price increases until
the state’s 60-day waiting period elapses.47 The court dismissed the law-
suit for lack of standing,48 but PhRMA filed a new complaint and the
case is still pending.49
When a state seeks disclosure of private or confidential information,
it must also consider the potential for trade secret preemption. Nevada’s
drug transparency law specifically amended the state definition of a trade
secret to exclude any disclosures required by the law, so that the state
could publish any drug pricing information it collected.50 PhRMA and
the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) filed a civil suit alleging
that federal trade secret law and the Fifth Amendment takings clause pre-
empted the Nevada law because disclosure of confidential or proprietary
information would destroy the value of trade secret property without rec-
ompense. PhRMA and BIO, however, withdrew the lawsuit after the state
agreed to a process by which manufacturers could request state regulators
keep any disclosures confidential.51
The experiences of California and Nevada demonstrate that any
state lawmakers considering similar legislation should anticipate a vigor-
ous legal challenge from industry. Lawmakers must carefully craft the
legislation to thread the needle of federal preemption while facilitating
disclosure of data that can be used to guide other state policies. While
laws requiring disclosure of public information should survive legal chal-
lenges, the information gained will be of limited value. Transparency
laws that collect negotiated prices and pricing methodology will prove
more effective at addressing rising drug costs, but disclosure of such
information may be limited by legal challenges.
c. Importation of Drugs from Canada and Other Countries
In May 2018, Vermont Governor Phil Scott signed S-175 into law,
making Vermont the first state to begin development of a wholesale
importation program for prescription drugs. Vermont’s Agency of Human
46 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pharm. Research & Manufacturers of Am. v.
Brown, Case 2:17-at-01323 (E.D. Cal. December 8, 2017).
47 Id.
48 Pharm. Research & Manufacturers of Am. v. Brown, No. 217CV02573MCEKJN, 2018 WL
4144417, 5-6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018).
49 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. David, Case 17-CV-02573 (E.D. Cal.
December 8, 2017).
50 SB-539, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(5)(b) (2017).
51 Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, Approved regulation of the Department of
Health and Human Services, LCB File No. R042-18, effective May 31, 2018 (2018), http://dhhs.
nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhhsnvgov/content/HCPWD/Sec%20of%20State%20Official(1).pdf.
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Services issued a report to the Vermont Legislature concluding that a
drug importation program for 17 of the most costly medications would
save up to $5 million annually.52 To begin importing drugs, however, the
Vermont legislature required the state’s importation program to comply
with any HHS regulations.53 Congress already permits the reimportation
and sale of prescription drugs manufactured in the United States and
exported to certain foreign markets, as long as the HHS Secretary can
ensure an adequate level of safety and significant cost savings for U.S.
consumers.54 To date, however, no HHS Secretary has ever certified this
required level of safety. As a result, while Vermont’s law may survive
potential legal challenges, the requirement to obtain approval from the
federal government currently stymies the impact of this law.
Nonetheless, the concept of allowing the importation of some drugs
from other countries to control prices has gained traction. In 2018, eight
other states considered legislation to set up their own drug importation
program, and thus far in 2019 Colorado, Maine, and Florida passed drug
reimportation bills.55 Even if no state establishes an operational drug
importation program, perhaps the growing state demand for federal action
will prove more important. In July 2018, HHS Secretary Azar directed
the FDA to set up a working group to explore a targeted drug import-
ation program for generic drugs that experience an excessive price
increase56 and, in 2019, Congress introduced multiple bills to import
drugs from Canada.57 What becomes of this explorative effort remains to
be seen.
Unlike the other laws discussed in previous sections, the pharma-
ceutical industry may choose not to challenge these importation programs
through legal action, but rather retaliate by rewriting distribution con-
tracts in other countries to disincentivize them from reimporting drugs
into the United States. As a result, states passing importation laws may
not face lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of these laws as long
52 VERMONT AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE: WHOLESALE
IMPORTATION PROGRAM FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS LEGISLATIVE REPORT (Dec 31, 2018), https://nashp.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Report-to-VT-Legislature-on-Rx-Wholesale-Importation-1_3_
2019.pdf.
53 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §804, 21U.S.C. §384 (c)(3) (2012).
54 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117
Stat. 2066, 2464-2469 (2003-2004).
55 2019 FL S.B. 1452 (NS) and 2019 CO S.B. 5 (NS).
56 Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Secretary Azar Directs FDA
to Establish Working Group on Drug Importation to Address Price Spikes (July 19, 2018) (https://
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/07/19/hhs-secretary-azar-directs-fda-establish-working-group-drug-
importation-address-price-spikes.html).
57 Safe and Affordable Drugs from Canada Act of 2019, H.R. 478 and S. 61, 116th Cong. (2019-
2020); Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act, H.R. 447 and S. 97, 116th Cong.
(2019-2020).
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as they require approval by the program by HHS. Nonetheless, states
should recognize that importation programs may not significantly reduce
drug prices as industry will likely make it difficult for foreign entities to
resell drugs and for patients to obtain them at lower prices from
foreign pharmacies.
3. Direct Rate Regulations or Controls
The third set of laws, direct rate regulation or controls, has the
greatest potential to control drug costs, but no state has yet successfully
implemented rate setting or price gouging statutes. By directly regulating
drug prices or preventing excessive increases in drug prices, these laws
give state Attorneys General or agencies more control over the price paid
for drugs, not just patient cost-sharing. States considering these measures
should recognize that they are likely to face significant legal challenge
and retaliation by industry. Nonetheless, states considering price gouging
or rate setting provisions are focusing their efforts on policies that are
most likely to reduce drug expenditures.
a. Price Gouging Prohibitions
In 2018, fifteen states considered prohibitions against price-gouging
for pharmaceuticals by preventing manufacturers from raising drug prices
by an “unconscionable” amount. In a now classic example of excessive
pharmaceutical price increases, Martin Shkreli, former CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals, raised the price of Daraprim, a drug that treats rare
toxoplasmosis and cystoisosporiasis infections, from $13.50 to $750 per
pill overnight.58 Price hikes like these are increasingly common. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied generic drugs covered
by the Medicare Part D program and reported that “[m]ore than 300 of
the established generic drugs analyzed had at least one extraordinary
price increase of 100% or more between first quarter 2010 and first quar-
ter 2015.”59
In 2017, Maryland passed the first law prohibiting price gouging for
essential off-patent or generic drugs (HB 631).60 The law allowed the
Attorney General to bring a civil lawsuit when a price increase for an
essential off-patent or generic medication was “unjustified” and
“unconscionable.” The law did not set a threshold price or price increase
58 Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight. N.Y. TIMES, September
20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-
price-raises-protests.html?_r=0.
59 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE: PART D GENERIC
DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES (August 2016).
60 MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. §§ 2-801-803.
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that constituted price gouging; instead, it left those questions to the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General and the courts. Upon challenge, the law
grants the manufacturer the opportunity to justify the price increase.61
While the law would likely not prevent manufacturers from raising drug
prices over time, it should prevent generic manufacturers from exploiting
market inefficiencies to raise prices without justification.
The Maryland law, however, was not allowed to take effect. In
April 2018, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held Maryland’s law uncon-
stitutional because it violated the dormant commerce clause.62 The court
held that the law violated the externality doctrine of the dormant com-
merce clause. Specifically, “a State may not regulate commerce occurring
wholly outside of its borders” and the externality “principle applies if it
either expressly applies to out-of-state commerce, or has that ‘practical
effect,’ regardless of the legislature's intent.”63 The 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Maryland’s law applied to drugs made available for
sale in Maryland, but not necessarily sold in the state so it regulated
transactions that did not result in drugs actually sold in Maryland.
Furthermore, “the lawfulness of a price increase is measured according to
the price the manufacturer or wholesaler charges in the initial sale of the
drug,” so the court held that Maryland’s law regulated sales that
occurred outside of the state.64 Some legal scholars have questioned the
validity of this opinion,65 but in February 2019, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari for Maryland’s appeal. The decisions in this case and
Maryland’s considerable legal battle effectively halted other states’
efforts to enact prescription price gouging laws – none of the sixteen bills
considered in 2018 passed state legislatures, and in 2019, only five states
considered similar bills.66
61 The law also provides that if the increased price was due to increased costs of production or
expanded access to the drug, the increase in price is not price gouging.
62 Ass'n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 673-74 (4th Cir. 2018).
63 Ass'n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 668 (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales,
278 F.3d 339, 355 (4th Cir. 2002)).
64 Id. at 671.
65 See Isaac D. Buck’s paper, States as Activists, ___ J. LEGAL MED. ___ (2019) for a more detailed
explanation of the legal doctrines in the case.
66 The sixteen states considering legislation in 2018 were: Colorado (SB 152), Illinois (HB 4900),
Louisiana (HB 243 and HB 710), Massachusetts (S 652), Michigan (SB 900 / HB 5690),
Minnesota (SF 2841/HF 3131), Mississippi (HB 137), New Hampshire (HB 1780), New Jersey (S
1590/A 3987), New York (A 5249/S 7028, A 5733/S 2544, A 7087/S 5262), Rhode Island (H
7022), Vermont (H 713), Virginia (SB 223), Washington (SB 5995/HB 255), and Wisconsin (SB
874/AB 1046). As of this writing, Indiana (SB 415), New Jersey (A 4216/S 2630 and A 3987/S
1590), New York (A 237/S 803, A1452/ S 2893,A 2621/S 1642, A 3829/S 1798 and A 6606/ S
141), Tennessee (HB 887/SB 963), and Virginia (SB 1308) have considered price gouging bans
for pharmaceuticals in the 2019 session.
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States seeking to protect their residents from excessive price
increases should expect a similar legal fight. While states should consider
crafting legislation that considers only prices paid by consumers in the
state when determining if price gouging occurred, states pursuing these
laws should expect strong legal challenges from industry. In addition,
states should recognize that even if they are able to enact price gouging
laws, they may not have a meaningful impact of drug prices overall.
While these laws prevent excessive price increases for generic drugs to
treat rare diseases, drug manufacturers may simply increase the price of
their drug on release and continue to increase the price below any thresh-
old set in legislation or regulation.
b. Rate Setting
Perhaps the most effective way for a state to control prescription
drug costs is to directly set drug prices or establish an all-payer cap,
which would set a maximum price for both public and private payers
within the state. In 2018, eight states – California, Florida, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island – consid-
ered such legislation. Three of those states, Maryland, Minnesota, and
New Jersey, introduced bills based on the National Academy for State
Health Policy’s (NASHP) Rate-Setting Model Legislation. This model
legislation establishes a Drug Cost Review Commission, similar to a pub-
lic utility commission, that establishes a payment cap for certain drugs
that payers cannot exceed. Rhode Island’s effort, in contrast, sets max-
imum prices only for drugs for which the State Board of Pharmacy deter-
mines are “so high that [they] jeopardize[] the state’s ability to meet the
needs of the state’s population for that drug.”67 Once the board makes
that determination, the “board may set the maximum allowable price that
the manufacturer can charge for that prescription drug” when sold for use
in the state. Other states chose to tie their rates to standard benchmarks.
For example, Ohio’s bill would prohibit insurers, both private and public
(including Ohio’s Medicaid program), from paying more than the amount
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reimburses for
the same drug.68 In an attempt to avoid preemption by ERISA and the
Federal Employee Health Benefits Act, the state legislature exempted
self-insured employers and the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program from this price cap.69 While rate setting may be one of the best
67 S. 2550 and H. 7042, 115th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018).
68 S.B. 253, 133d Gen. Assem., (Ohio 2018).
69 Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis SB 253 132nd General Assembly (As
Introduced) (Feb 5, 2018), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=9358&format=pdf.
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methods for states to control drug costs, no state has yet mustered the
political will required to pass such a measure.
Furthermore, any state passing rate setting legislation should expect
significant legal challenges from industry. In 2007, PhRMA and the
Biotechnology Industry Org (BIO) successfully challenged a District of
Columbia law that capped wholesale drug prices at “30% higher than the
comparable price in any high income country in which the product is
protected by patents or other exclusive marketing rights.”70 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the law preempted by fed-
eral patent laws. While legal scholars have asserted that patent law
should not preempt the NASHP model legislation and rate regulation of
pharmaceuticals should not amount to unconstitutional “regulatory
takings” under the Fifth Amendment,71 any state passing rate setting
legislation should expect rigorous legal challenges from industry with
uncertain outcomes.
Overall, efforts by states to pass legislation to address rising drug
costs have been aggressively challenged by industry. As a result, much
of the legislation considered in recent legislative sessions targeted spe-
cific anticompetitive practices (e.g. gag-clause prohibitions, price-gouging
prohibitions) or are likely to have minimal impact due to efforts to avoid
preemption by federal law (e.g. regulation of PBMs and transparency
measures). Nonetheless, these new laws form part of a multifaceted state
and federal effort to ensure prescription drug affordability and value for
patients. In addition to passing legislation, many states also used their
power as a purchaser of prescription drugs to adopt new cost control
measures without risk of legal challenge.
USE OF STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PLANS PROGRAMS TO
CONTROL DRUG COSTS
Some states leveraged their power as health care payers in the state
employee or retirement plans to lower prescription drug spending. Often
these efforts did not require action by the state legislature. For example,
many state employee programs implemented financial incentives to
encourage their members to shop for high-value care. For pharmaceuti-
cals, these incentives encourage patients and providers to choose cheaper
drugs in a therapeutic class and to promote the use of generic equivalents
when possible.
70 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
71 Robin Feldman, et al., National Academy for State Health Policy White Paper, Federalism,
Patents, and the Constitutionality of State Pharmaceutical Regulation (March 2018), https://
nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/White-Paper-2018.pdf.
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For instance, in 2018, California’s Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS), a state agency that manages retirement benefits for
public employees, announced it would expand its reference pricing pro-
gram to pharmaceuticals.72 Reference prices are prices set by a payer that
establish the highest amount a payer will pay for a particular good or ser-
vice. Since 2011, CalPERS has used reference pricing to encourage its
beneficiaries to shop for higher value care for non-emergency care
including joint replacement surgery, outpatient colonoscopies, and cata-
ract surgeries. Beginning in 2019, CalPERS will use reference pricing for
pharmaceuticals in three therapeutic classes - nasal corticosteroids, thy-
roid medications, and estrogens for members using basic health plans
serviced by PBM OptumRx.73 The CalPERS reference pricing system
allows patients to obtain a more expensive drug as long as the patient
pays the difference between the cost of that care and the reference price.
The CalPERS program, therefore, gives patients and providers flexibility
in choosing which drug in a class to use by setting the maximum
CalPERS would pay for three classes of drugs, but it incentivizes the
patient to choose lower cost drugs.
Other states have implemented right-to-shop or savings reward
programs for their public employees that, like reference pricing, encour-
age patients to shop for higher value care. Like reference pricing pro-
grams, insurers create savings reward programs to give patients a
financial incentive for choosing providers with lower than average
costs. Typically, the insurer agrees to share any savings generated when
the patient chooses a lower cost provider. As a result, right-to-shop pol-
icies give patients a financial incentive to seek lower cost, high-quality
care even if they have a flat co-payment or have met their deductible
for the year. As with the reference pricing program used by CalPERS,
these savings only apply to shoppable services where the patient has the
ability to compare costs and quality of multiple providers. With right-
to-shop programs, unlike with reference pricing, this financial incentive
to seek low-cost, high-quality care is independent of any threshold or
reference price.
New Hampshire was the first state to implement a right to shop pro-
gram in 2015, when they commissioned Anthem to develop a right-to-shop
program for state employees. In the first three years of the program, the state
72 CalPERS, Pension and Health Benefits Committee Agenda Item 6: Strategy for Reference Pricing
Pharmaceuticals by Therapeutic Class (Pilot) (April 17, 2018), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/
board-agendas/201804/pension/item-6-a.pdf.
73 CalPERS, Pension and Health Benefits Committee Agenda Item 7(b): Strategy for Reference
Pricing Pharmaceuticals by Therapeutic Class (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/
board-agendas/201811/pension/item-7b_a.pdf.
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saved $11 million.74 In 2018, Utah passed the state’s Health Insurance Right
to Shop law in which it required the Public Employees' Benefit and
Insurance Program to implement a savings reward program and encouraged
other health insurers to develop and implement similar programs by amend-
ing the Insurance Code.75 The success of existing right-to-shop programs has
increased their popularity rapidly. In 2018, Florida, Oklahoma, Arizona, and
South Carolina also considered legislation to establish similar right-to-shop
programs, and Nebraska passed legislation to allow shared savings provisions
in insurance benefits, and, in just the first two months of 2019, Illinois,
Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee introduced similar legislation.
Nonetheless, states can implement these programs for their public employees
without legislative action. For example, Kansas, Kentucky, and
Massachusetts recently established programs for their public employees with-
out legislative action. Right-to-shop programs do not directly target drug
costs, but states could easily adopt shared savings programs to include finan-
cial rewards for choosing cheaper therapeutic alternatives or for using mail-
order pharmacies.
To leverage the volume of its state-wide pharmaceutical drug pur-
chasing, California’s Governor, Gavin Newsom, ordered the Department
of Health Care Services to consider combining the state purchasing for the
Medicaid program, CalPERS, and other groups for whom the state pro-
vides prescription coverage.76 In his first executive order, in January 2019,
he directed the state to identify the 25 highest cost drugs and set up a bulk
purchasing program or negotiate directly with manufacturers to reduce the
cost for these drugs. The executive order further required the Department
of General Services to develop a framework for providing any discounts
received by state bulk purchasing efforts to all purchasers in the state
including private insurers. In 2018, Vermont also considered purchasing
pharmaceuticals directly from a wholesaler. Vermont’s Governor, Phil
Scott, signed a law77 creating a working group to “investigate and analyze
prescription drug pricing throughout the prescription drug supply chain in
order to identify opportunities for savings for Vermont consumers and
other payers and for increasing prescription drug price transparency at all
levels of the supply chain.” In November 2018, the group recommended
that the Department of Vermont Health Access, the state’s Medicaid pro-
gram, explore a contract with a single drug wholesaler to supply drugs to
74 Josh Archambault, Right To Shop: The Next Big Thing In Health Care, FORBES, Aug. 5 2016,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/08/05/right-to-shop-the-next-big-thing-in-health-
care/#31bda24b4f60.
75 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-647 (amended 2018).
76 Cal. Exec. Order No. N-01-19 (January 7, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/EO-N-01-19-Attested-01.07.19.pdf.
77 VT. ACT. NO. 193, § 11a (2018).
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Medicaid-enrolled pharmacies for the Vermont Medicaid program because
the working group “believe[d] that both savings and transparency can be
achieved through channel simplification.”78 The group, however, did not
receive any responses to a request for information from wholesalers. As a
result, whether Vermont can realistically implement a direct purchasing
arrangement remains unknown. Vermont’s experience shows that even
when a state has the political will and resources to implement new strat-
egies to control costs, it is still subject to retaliation by the industry.
California’s bulk purchasing program may be more difficult for industry to
ignore because it covers many more people than Vermont’s Medicaid pro-
gram. MediCal, California’s Medicaid program, is the largest Medicaid
program in the country, covering more than 13 million residents,79 and
CalPERS covers 1.5 million people, making it the second largest employer
purchaser of health benefits after the Federal Employees’ Health Benefits
Program.80 California’s negotiating power may prove more persuasive
than that of smaller states, but whether and how California will be able to
overcome the political and logistical hurdles to creating a bulk prescription
drug purchasing program for diverse state programs and private insurers
remains to be seen. Other states should monitor California’s progress to
determine the value of multi-state purchasing agreements for pharmaceut-
ical drugs.
While constrained in many legislative efforts, states retain a variety
of tools at their disposal to control pharmaceutical spending. States
should recognize the flexibility they have to tailor their state employee
benefits to ensure better value for health care spending. Furthermore,
even though these programs may not cover large portions of the popula-
tion, especially in smaller states, states should recognize that these pro-
grams can both save millions of dollars for state budgets and serve as
examples of effective cost-savings for private insurers.
SUGGESTIONS FOR STATES
When implementing measures to address rising drug prices, states
face significant challenges to enacting meaningful policies. These
78 VERMONT AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH CARE AND THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND WELFARE BY THE AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES: VERMONT
MEDICAID DRUG WHOLESALER SAVINGS INITIATIVE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://legislature.vermont.gov/
assets/Legislative-Reports/Sec.11a-Act-193-Prescription-Drug-Cost-Savings-and-Price-
Transparency.pdf.
79 California Department of Health Care Services, Medi-Cal at a Glance, (August 2018), https://
www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Documents/Medi-Cal_at_a_Glance_Aug2018_ADA.pdf.
80 CalPERS, CalPERS Story (updated April 16, 2019), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/about/
organization/calpers-story.
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difficulties, however, must be seen as a call to action, rather than as an
excuse for inertia. States must learn from each other both in testing new
legislative actions and developing new programs in their state employee
programs. We offer four suggestions for states looking to advance their
efforts at controlling drug costs.
First, numerous factors contribute to drug expenditures, and states
should ensure that any new policies directly target the reasons for the
increase. To use a targeted strategy, however, policymakers need to
know the drivers of high drug costs in their state. Since the net price
paid by insurers (i.e. the price after rebates and discounts) for drugs is
often confidential, policymakers can only guess at which policies will
address the critical underlying reasons for increasing drug expenditures.
Researchers at the University of Pittsburgh found that list prices for
drugs (i.e. the WAC) increased at nearly six times the rate of inflation
between 2013 and 2015,81 but a report by IQVIA, an independent insti-
tute, found that net prices for drugs grew only 1.5% in 2017.82
Reconciling the reasons for the variation between these two numbers
could lead to different policy decisions. For example, if the IQVIA report
correctly reports that the net price for drugs is barely increasing, law-
makers should consider policies that target PBMs and insurers who may
profit from the bubble between the net and list prices. Although the
inability of researchers at the University of Pittsburgh to access net prices
severely limited their study, the results suggest that price increases for
existing brand-name drugs and the release of new, expensive specialty
drugs drove price increases. Policymakers seeking to address these con-
cerns should consider rate-setting or price gouging legislation. The obfus-
cation of the net cost of drugs hinders the ability of lawmakers to target
the most effective policies. Transparency laws, specifically those that
seek to obtain net prices by requiring disclosures by PBMs and insurers,
remain critical to help build an understanding of what prescription drug
prices are and how they affect insurance premiums. Nonetheless, trans-
parency measures alone are unlikely to significantly decrease drug costs.
States, therefore, should not pass these laws with the expectation that
transparency alone will reduce costs by allowing patients to choose
cheaper medications, but rather with the expectation that these laws will
allow the state to gather information and support for additional, targeted
legislative efforts.
81 Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus Existing Inflation in
the Rising Cost of Drugs, 38 HEALTH AFFAIRS 76, 76 (2019).
82 Medicine Use and Spending in the U.S., IQVIA, (April 19, 2018), https://www.iqvia.com/institute/
reports/medicine-use-and-spending-in-the-us-review-of-2017-outlook-to-2022 (last visited Feb
14, 2019).
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Secondly, states seeking to address drug costs should band together
and consolidate purchasing power to mitigate retaliation from industry.
For example, wholesalers who declined to participate in a pilot program
in Vermont might find it much more difficult to refuse to work with a
multi-state purchasing program. In addition, states could require partici-
pation in bulk purchasing programs from the wholesalers serving the
Medicaid program and/or their employee benefit plans, and offer that
program to private insurers, as California’s governor did in his executive
order. Montana’s experience with its employee benefit plan demonstrates
success in setting prices for health services and demanding transparent
pricing for all drugs. Other states can learn from and join Montana in
demanding transparency in how the state spends money on health serv-
ices and setting reasonable rates for all services. Furthermore, if states
allow private insurers in these programs, they can significantly increase
their bargaining power with drug manufacturers and wholesalers. In
2018, Vermont considered legislation to direct the state’s Agency of
Human Services to “explore opportunities to work with other states to
create a public multistate pharmacy benefit management program.”83
While Vermont did not pass this bill, it demonstrates a willingness to
work with other states and a recognition that effective policies to address
drug costs likely transcend state borders.
Third, there are no silver bullets. States must recognize that a single
policy is unlikely to contain drug expenditures and consider multifaceted
approaches. In implementing an interwoven network of policies, states
can both address the different underlying reasons for rising drug costs
and mitigate retaliation by the pharmaceutical industry. For example, in
2018, Vermont passed legislation banning pharmacist gag-clauses,
expanding biosimilar substitution, regulating and mandating disclosures
from PBMs, creating a drug importation program, and directly supplying
Medicaid recipients with prescription drugs. Although the state faced
challenges in implementing some of these laws, it demonstrated its will-
ingness to address the problem of drug costs from multiple angles. In
Maryland, the courts overturned the law prohibiting price gouging for
prescriptions, so the state should consider other ways to limit price
increases, including transparency laws that might shame drug companies
into limiting price increases or rate setting policies. The states that
address rising drug costs on multiple levels, including laws that target
specific market inefficiencies, promote competition, and target the net
price of drugs, are most likely to control drug expenditures.
83 S. 163, Xth Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Vt. 2018).
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Finally, states should consider whether policies to address drug pri-
ces are the most effective use of their resources. Most states have already
passed laws that will not likely face industry challenge (i.e. biosimilar
substitution and banning of gag-clauses), so states should expect that the
pharmaceutical industry will vigorously oppose any action to control
drug spending. Furthermore, prescription drugs only account for 10-14%
of healthcare expenditures,84 so states should consider whether to spend
their efforts and resources on policies that target drug prices or those that
address health costs as a whole, like a public option or single-payer sys-
tem. A study by Zack Cooper and collaborators found that from 2007 to
2014, prices for hospital inpatient care grew 42 percent while prices for
inpatient physician services grew only 18 percent.85 While that study did
not consider prescription drugs, data from the U.S. Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services shows that the total expenditures on prescription
drugs in the U.S. increased by approximately 25 percent from 2007 to
2014, and much of that increase could be due to increased use.86 These
data show that many factors contribute to the increased spending on
health care, and states should consider whether policies that address only
prescription spending provide the most value for state time
and resources.
The legal and political hurdles faced by states trying to implement
new strategies to control drug costs are large. Nonetheless, the difficulty
American’s have in affording prescription medications should encourage
states to redouble their efforts to protect their citizens and to call on the
federal government to intervene where necessary (e.g. amending ERISA
law and clarifying the Medicaid best-price calculations) to allow them to
tailor policies to control drug costs to their state. Without government
intervention, drug prices will continue to escalate in a way that will hin-
der the economy and obstruct patients from accessing neces-
sary medication.
CONCLUSION
Prescription drug costs continue to be a top concern for Americans.
Economists compared healthcare expenditures in the U.S. to those of
84 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2017: OECD INDICATORS (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-2017-en.
85 Zack Cooper et al., Hospital Prices Grew Substantially Faster Than Physician Prices For
Hospital-Based Care In 2007–14, 38 HEALTH AFFAIRS 184, 186 (2019).
86 U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Accounts
(NHEA), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html.
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other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and found that “US prices for a market basket of
brand-name prescription drugs and medical devices are often two to three
times higher than prices in other OECD countries, but there is consider-
able variation in prices for specific drugs and devices across countries.”87
With inaction by the federal government, nearly every state considered
legislation in 2018 to address rising drug costs, and many also made
changes to prescription drug coverage by their Medicaid or state
employee benefit program. Nonetheless, it remains unclear if these
actions will mitigate rising drug costs, especially as experts predict
prescription drug costs will continue to contribute to health spending
growth.88 Furthermore, nearly all state efforts to control costs were met
with legal challenges or retaliation by the pharmaceutical industry. As a
result, states must judiciously expend their resources and political capital
to ensure that the policies they implement best address the reasons for
the increased spending on pharmaceuticals, and healthcare costs as
a whole.
87 Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s Still The Prices, Stupid: Why The US
Spends So Much On Health Care, And A Tribute To Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFFAIRS 87,
92 (2019).
88 Gigi A. Cuckler et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2017–26: Despite Uncertainty,
Fundamentals Primarily Drive Spending Growth, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 482, 484 (2018).
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